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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
PETER McKELLAR, MARY HELEN
PARSONS, JAMES LESLIE McKELLAR, CHARLES McKE'LLAR and GLEN
McKELLAR,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

-vs-

Case No.
11456

NELLIE McKELLAR,
Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF CASE
This is an ac'tion by appellants (hereinafter referred to
as plaintiffs) against Nellie McKellar, respondent (hereinafter referred to as defendant) to set aside a deed, a
copy of which is attached to the amended complain'. (R. 13),
or an order of the Court declaring that the defenc'ant holds
the property that i's the subject matter of this action in
trust for the benefit of the heirs of Mary McKei.lar.
DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT
Upon motion of the defendant the tria' court granted
summary judgmen't against plaintiffs statinr that there were

no material issues of fact to be determined at a trial, and
also granted defendant's motion to quiet title to the proper'ty
in the name of defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiffs seek a reversal of the judgment below
and a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and for trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs are children of John M. McKellar and Mary
McKellar. John M. McKellar and Mary McKellar owned the
property that is the subject matter of this law suit as joint
tenants. John M. McKellar died and his wife, Mary, as
survivor, became the sole fee title holder of the property.
Subsequent to John M. McKellar's death and prior to Mary
McKellar's death, Mary McKellar executed a deed wherein
she conveyed the subject property to her two daughters,
Mary Helen Parsons and Montella McKellar Dick, and concurremy she executed an agreement that is marked Exhibit "A." and attached to plaintiffs' amended complaint
(R. 13). This agreement indicates that the deed to Mary
Helen !'arsons and Montella McKellar Dick placed the
property in trust and that they held the subject property
for the be1efit of all the sons and daughters, eight in total,
of Mary McKellar. Mary McKellar died on or about May 5,
1945. Mary :{elen McKellar Parsons and Montella McKellar
Dick executei a deed to Frank McKellar and N'ellie McKellar, his wife, which, by mistake, contained the subject
propery. Fran1 McKellar is deceased and his wife, Nellie
McKelar, is tht defendant in this action.
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PLAINTIFFS' POSITION
The trial court's decision should be reversed and the
case remanded for further proceedings and for a trial on the
following grounds:
Plaintiffs pleaded facts indicating that the subject
property was mistakenly included in a deed by Mary Helen
Parsons and Montella McKellar Dick granting the property to defendant.
1.

2. Plaintiffs pleaded facts showing that there was a
trust executed by Mary McKellar for the benefit of her
children, that the subject property was part of the trust
and that the trust remained in effec't and is still in effect
for the benefit of plaintiffs.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFFS' PLEADINGS AND AFFIDAVIT'S
(R. 14-17) INDICATE THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS MISTAKENLY INCLUDED IN THE
DEED BY MARY HELEN PARSONS AND MONTELLA
McKELLAR DICK GRANTING THE SUBJECT PROPERTY TO DEFENDANT.
Paragraph 6 of the affidavit of Mary Helen Parsons
(R. 16) states she was unaware that the property had been
included in the deed until approximately November, 1966.
Mis'take of fact, is, however, a well-recognized
ground for interposition of a Court of equity. According to the circumstances, a court of equity will
order the cancellation or reformation of a deed
where it appears that a material mistake has been
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made, or it may order that the party injured be compensated by a money payment, notwithstanding the
fact that the deed embodies an executed contract.
Where it appears that by mutual mistake of all
parties the instrument does not conform to or express their in'tention or agreement, as where by
mistake some material part of the instrument is
omitted or the deed is drawn to convey a different
interest or a greater or lesser estate than was agreed
upon, relief may be had in equity against the other
party to the conveyance or his privies and those
who purchased from with notice of the mistake.
Such relief should be sought promptly upon
discovery of the mistake, to avoid any suggestion of
laches on the plaintiffs' part. A grantor is not, however, chargeable with laches which will defeat his
right to equitable relief from a mistake where he
moves within a reasonable time after becoming
aware of the mistake to have the matter rectified.
23 Am. Jur. 2d, 201-2 Deeds§ 155.
It is generally agreed tha!t equitable cancellation
may be decreed on the ground of a material mistake
made by one party only to a deed, including material
mistake as to identity, situation, boundaries, title,
or amount of land conveyed. A deed may be cancelled for a unilateral mistake on the part of the
grantor which renders it inequitable for the grantee
to have the benefit thereof, even though the parties
dealt at arm's length and on an equal footing and
the grantor was negilgent, if his mistake was not
a breach of duty. 33 Am. Jur. 2d, 203-4 Deeds § 156.

POINT II
PLAINTIFFS CONTEND THAT T H E Y ARE
BENEFICIARIES OF THE PROPERTY THAT IS THE
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SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS LAW SUIT AND ARE,
THEREFORE, ENTITLED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE
SHARES AS OUTLINED IN EXHIBIT "A" OF PLAINTIFFS' AMENDED COMPLAINT (R. 13).
Plaintiffs contend that the agreement attached to plaintiffs' complaint (R. 13) executed concurrer.tly with the
deed from Mary McKellar to her two daughters established
a trust wherein the two daughters held the property as
trustees for the benefit of all eight children of Mary Mer
Kellar. The agreement itself bears this out in the last paragraph of the agreement wherein it states that . . . "it is
understood further, that in the event any one of the eight
or any one of the above-named heirs die before the estate is
exhausted or the funds completely used up, then in that
case, that portion go to the issue or children of the one who
dies, if the one who dies should die without issue or any
children, then that part of the estate is to be divided equally among the remaining children listed above."
This language clearly indicates the grantor's intention
was for the trustee of the property to divide the property
equally among the eight children. When Mary Parsons
McKellar and Montella McKellar Dick executed the deed,
Exhitit "B" (R. 13) to Frank and Nellie McKellar, Frank
and Nellie McKellar took the property as trustees.
If the property was held in actual trust, then the property would still be held as an actual trust today for the
benefit of the beneficiaries. The law allows a substitute
trustee to be named to a trust and that subsequent trustees
are bound the same as their prececessors.

A substitute or successor trustee when appointed
steps into the place of the old trustee, charged with
the trust, and with all the powers and duties of the
old trustee. He assumes the trust estate, sees to all
imperfections and con onere, that is, subject to all
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liabilities binding the trust estate in the hands of
his predece'ssor. A deed from the old trustee to a
new trustee cannot pu't the new trustee's powers beyond the control of the Court appointing him. 54
Am. Jur., 113 Trusts§ 133.
Plaintiffs argue that the trust is still in effect today
and that Frank and Nellie McKellar are trustees, and the
children and heirs of Mary McKellar are t'he beneficiaries.
Plaintiffs contend that Frank and Nellie McKellar received
the property with knowledge that it was to be used for the
benefit of all of the children of Mary McKellar.
POINT III
PLAINTIFFS CONTEND THAT IF FRANK AND
NELLIE McKELLAR DO NOT HOLD THE PROPERTY AS ACTUAL TRUSTEES, THEY HOLD THE PROPERTY AS CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTEE'S. IF PROPERY IS HELD IN A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST, THE
BENEFICIARIES RETAIN AN EQUITABLE INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY A'S TRUSTEES AND
CAN FOLLOW THE PROCEEDS UNLESS THE
TRANSFEREES ARE BONA FIDE PURCHASERS
FOR V A'LUE AND WITHOUT NOTICE OF THE
TRUST AGREEMENT.
"It is a fundamental rule having great practical application particularly in all those fields olf law involving fiduciary relationships that equity will pursue property that is wrongfully converted by a fiduciary or otherwise compel restitution to the beneficiary. The rule is actually one of trust, since the
wrongful conversion gives rise to constructive trust
which pursues the property, its produc't, or proceeds
in accordance with the rule. Hence, the rule well
may be ·called 'The Trust Pursuit Rule,' or 'The Rule
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of Trust Pursuit.' Under the rule, a trust will follow property through all changes in its state and
form, so long as such property, its product or its
proceeds are capable of identification. It will follow
the property into the hands of the transfeTee other
than a bona fide purchaser for value, or restitution
will be enforced, at the election of the beneficiary,
through r'ecourse against the trustee or the transferee, personally or through compelling the transferee to perform the trust, except in ·so far as the
transferee is protected as a bona fide purchaser for
value. The Trust Pursuit Rule applies where a constructive or a resulting trust, as well as where an
express trust has once affixed itself to property in
a certain state or form.
This Rule of Trust Pursuit has been recognized and
applied in courts of equity from a very early period.
It has been grounded on the principle of property
that ownership continues and can be asserted by the
true owner as against any withholding of the object
to which the ownership pertains, whether such object of the ownership is found in the hands of an
original holder or a transferee, or in a different
form, so long as they can be identified." 54 Am. Jur.
190-1 Trust § 248.
"Where the sale of the trust property is unauthorized and a breach of trust, the trust follows such
property into the hands of the transferee, irrespective of any security given by the transferee, unless
the transfere'e is protected as a bona fide purchaser
for value, the illegality of the transaction by which
the trust property or funds are transferred does not
effect the operation of the rule, where the benefici1ary is not a party 'to that illegality." 54 Am. Jur.
195-6 Trusts § 252.

"The person to whom a transfer of trust property
constituting a wrongful conversion of the trust property and a breach of trust is made, when not protected as a bona fide purchaser for value is liable
and accountable as a constructive trustee in invitum
and ex maleficio or de son tort. His liability commences at the moment of the transfer of trust property to him and continues until there is full restoration to the beneficiary. Such a transferee acquires
no title whatever; he merely takes the place of his
transferor, and becomes chargeable with the execution of the trust to the same extent that such granter
was chargeable before the transfer." 54 Am. Jur.
196-7 Trusts § 254.
In the case of Webster v. Knop, 6 U.2d 273, 312 P.Zd
557, (1957) the court states:
"The second que'stion is: Were the subsequent transferees having notice of the grubstake agreement
and the original location in the names of the three
parties to the agreement bona fide purchasers for
value from the one who relocated so as to terminate
the equitable constructive trust interest in the beneficiaries?
The equitable interest of a trust in the beneficiaries may be cut off as against a bona fide purchaser
for value from the trustee or constructive
trustee. He must have had no notice, and he
must pay value. As stated in the Restatement, Restitution, §12 (a) adopted in the Peterson case: A person
has notice of facts giving rise to constructive trust
not only when he knows them, but also when he

should know them; that is when he knows facts
which would lead a reasonbale, inte'lligent and diligent person to inquire whether there are circumstances which would give rise to a constructive trust,
and if such inquiry when pursued with reasonable
intelligence and diligence would give him knowledge or reason to know such circumstances."
In the case of Peterson v. Peterson, 112 U. 554, 190
P.2d 135 (1948).
"The general rule in regard to 't'he rights of beneficiaries to reclaim trust property is stated in 54 American Jurisprudence Trusts, par. 266:
The right of a beneficiary of a trust to reclaim
trust property in the hands of a third person or to charge such third person as a constructive trustee is primarily a question of the
status of such third person as a bona fide purchaser
for value and without notice. Equities of the beneficiary of a trust in the property or funds of the
trust are cut off by the trustee's alienation or encumbrance of such trust property or funds to a purchaser
for value in good fai'th who has no actual or constructive notice of any breach of trust in the alienation or encumbrance, although 'this does not, of
course, deprive the beneficiary of his remedies of
enforcing the trust against the proceeds in the hands
of the trustee or against the trus'tee personally. Bu't
to be so pro:tected 'the purchaser must be both a purchaser for value in good faith, and without notice.
Equities are cut off only to the extent that a person
taking trust property or funds in good faith h'as
given value.

10

One who acquires trust property with notice of a
breach of trust or who is for any other reason not a
purchaser in good faith is not protected as against
equities of the beneficiary, but takes the property or
funds charged or 'impressed with the trust, notwithstanding he gives full value in the transaction. On
the other hand, one who has taken in good faith
and without notice of any breach of trust is no't protected if he gave no value. The purchaser, to be protected, must be a bona fide purchaser, not only at the
time of the contract or conveyance, but until the ,
purchase money is ac'tually paid.

Good fa:ith of one taking trust property is dependant upon having no notice, actual or constructive,
of any breach of trust in the transaction, and of having made such inquiry as the law would impose upon
the purchaser under the fact& of the particular case." '
"The general rule is that good faith in one taking
a transfer or encumbrance of trust property or funds
exists where he has no notice, actual or constructive,
of any breach of trust in the transaction and has
complied with such duty of inquiry as the law casts
upon him, but a mere denial of all knowledge of
fraud will not avaiil the purchaser from a 'trustee, if
the transaction is such as a court of equity cannot
sanction." 54 Am. Jur, 211 Trusts§ 267.
The Supreme Court of Utah held that an or al trus,t was
created between the heirs of Mrs. Maria A. Haws when she
executed a deed to her daughter, Arnber Haws, on the 18th
day of August 1927. Mrs. Haws contiued to live upon the
premises until her death on March 24, 1939. Fifteen days
after the death of Maria A. Haws, Amber Haws married
the defendant. Amber died on March 16, 1945. After Amber's
1
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death defendant proceeded to probate the estate and acquire
title to the property through the probate court. The same
day defendant was granted title by t!he probate court, plaintiffs, the sons and daugh'ters of Maria A. Haws and brothers
and sisters of Amber Haws, filed the action to create a trust
by virtue of the deed dated August 18, 1927. The court held
that an oral constructive trust was created for the benefit
of the heirs of Maria A. Haws when she executed the deed
to Amber Haws. Haws v. Jensen, 116 Ut. 212, 209 P.2d 222
(1949).
The Haws case is analagous to the McKellar case. Mary
McKellar, the mother of plaintiffs, executed a deed to her
two daughters and at the same time created a trust for the
benefit of the two daughters plus the remaining children.
The property was sll!bsequently conveyed by the two
daughters to Frank and Nellie McKellar. The intent of the
mother was cleady for the children to receive an equal portion of the property. The plaintiffs allowed defendant and
her husband to use the property because they were in close
proximity as stated in the affidavits (R. 14-17). Paragraphs
6 and 7 state that plaintiffs met with Frank McKellar and
it was decided that Frank could use the property. However,
at no time did plaintiffs relinquish 'their rights as beneficiaries under t'he trust.
1

POINT IV
DEFENDANT MISTAKENLY CONTENDS THAT
PLAINTIFFS RELINQUISHED THEIR RIGHT, TITLE
AND INTEREST TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Plaintiffs executed a document enti tled "Releas'e and
Consent," a copy of which it attached to phlin tiffs' brief
1

1
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(R. 24). Plaintiffs intended by the document only to allow
the sale of th'e property specifically set forth in the documen't.
The Agreement, Exhibit "A" attached to plaintiffs'
Amended complaint (R. 13), states that "the purpose of this
agreement is to supplement that certain GRANT DEED
MADE and dated this same day and said second parties
have full power to sell, mortgage, rent, lease or other means
of getting gainful use from said land and/ or lands. Such selling or mortgaging, however, to be done only with the consen't of 2/3 of the majority of the above named children of
Mary McKellar." The release and consent (R. 24) simply
stated that Frank McKellar "may proceed with the sale and
conveyance of any and all re•al property involved by the
terms of said agreement or involved in the Warranty Deed
from Mary McKellar to Mary Helen McKeHar Parsons and
Montella McKellar Dick dated December 17, 1942 . . . ."
Therefore, if the rele•ase and cons'ent is interpreted by
the Court as authority to Frank McKellar t'o sell the subject property, it in no way relinquishes plain'tiffs' right to
the proceeds from the sale. Therefore plaintiffs are still
entitled to their interest in the property.
POINT V
PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT IS NOT BARRED BY
VIRTUE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Defendants at the hearing relied on the case of Auerbach v. Samuels, 10 U.2d 152, 349 P.2d 1112 (1960) wherein
the Court held that a constructive trust is subject to the
statute of !'imitation's.

!
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Even under the plaintiffs' theory of wrongful distribution and constructive trust, the period whh'in
which an action must be commenced begins to run
from the time the person entitled to the property
knows, or by reasonable diligence and inquiry should
know, the relative facts.
d'id not have knowledge that the property
had been conveyed to Frank and Nellie McKellar as evidenced by their affidavits Paragraphs 5 & 6 (R. 14-17).
Therefore they had no reason to make inquiry or a diligent
search as to whether or not the property had been conveyed
because Frank and Nellie McKellar were given the right to
use the property by plaintiffs, as stated in their affidavits
(R. 14-17). Pl aintiffs contend that this fact would preclude
a duty of inquiry on plaintiffs to discover the conveyance
of the subjec't property to Frank and Nellie McKellar.
Pl~intiffs

1

In Jones Min. Co. v. Cardiff Min. and Mil/ Co., 56 U.
449, 191 P.426 (1920) an action to have the defendants declared trustees of a certain mining claim for the benefit
of plaintiff corporation, wherein plaintiff alleged collusion
between the defendants and the only director of the company to deprive the company of its in'tereSit in the claim, the
Court stated that in all such cases the statute of limi'tation
commences to run from the time when the complaining
party discovered the wrong complained of or from the time
when he was apprised o'f such facts and circumstances with
respect thereto as would put a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence upon inquiry.
POINT VI
DEFENDANT

CONTENDED

THAT

BECAUSE
HUS-

THE DEED TO HER AND HER DECEA'SED
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BAND WAS RECORDED THIS WOULD IMPART
NOTICE TO PLAINTIFFS. 57-3-2 U.C.A. (1953) states:
Every conveyance, or instrument in wri'ting affect.
ing real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved,
and certified, in the manner prescribed by this title,
and every patent to lands within this state duly
executed and verified according to law, and every
judgment, order or decree of 'any court of record in
this state, or a copy thereof, required by law to be
recorded in the office of the County Recorder shall,
from the time of filing the same with the Recorder
for record, impart notice to ·all persons of the con·
tents thereof; and subsequent purchasers, mortga·
gees and lien holders shall be de·emed to purchase
and take with notice.
In the case of Berendsen v. Mciver, 126 C.A. 347, 272
P.2d 76 (1954).
Defendant contends that pursuant to § 1213, Civil
Code, pl'ain'tiff had constructive notice of the contents of the deed because it was recorded. Section
1213 does not apply to a grantee of the particular
deed recorded. The section provided for constructive
notiC'e to "subsequent purchasers and motgagees"
only. As s1aid in 22 Cal. Jur., p. 724, Section 12: "The
mere recording of an instrument is not nO:tice of a
mistake therein .... "
Plaintiffs contend that the fact that the deed was recorded do,es not give notice to plainitiffs. It would be harsh,
indeed, to require all beneficiaries of a trust (adults and
minors alike) to check the records periodically to determine
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whether or not a trustee had conveyed the property in Which
they have a beneficial interest.
POINT VII
PLAINTIFFS CONTEND THAT
NELLIE McKELLAR DID NOT PAY
FOR THE PROPERTY.

FRANK AND
ANY VALUE

The deed indicates "$10.00 and other good and valuable
consideration." Plaintiffs contend that they have n:ot received any consideration for the property as stated in th e
affidavits Paragraph 9 (R. 14-17). In 17 Am. Jur. 2d 433
Contracts, § 90. Recitals of consideration and effect thereof:
1

The true rule appears to be that reci'tals of consideration, unless intended them:se'lves to embody a
contractual right or obligation, may be contradicted,
inasmuch as the consideration of a written instrument is generally open to inquiry. In a case in Which
the consideration for a written contract is mentioned merely by way o.f recital or as a receipt, the parol
evidence rule does not preclude the admission of
extrinsic evidence to show the true consideration,
even though such consideration is different from
that expressed.
It is the general practice to rec'ite in practically all
deeds as consideration, "Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other
good and valuable consideration," regardless of whether
or not an actual consideration has been given.

A court of equity in decreeing a constructive trust, is
hound by no unyielding formula, but is free to effect justice according to the equities peculiar to each transaction
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wherever a failure to perform a duty to convey property I
would result in unjusit enrichment, Haws v. Jensen, 116 U. i
I
212, 209 P.2d 229 (1949). Bogert on Trusts and Trustees,
Part I, 1946 Edition, § 471. Defendant would clearly be unjustly enriched by prevailing in this action; therefore, the
Court ·should remand this case to the trial court for trial
so that jus'tice may be done.
CONCLUSION
Summary judgment is a drastic remedy and Court
should 'be reluctant to deprive litigants of an opportunity
to fully present their contentions upon a trial, and there·
fore summary judgment should be granted only when
under the facts viewed in the light most favocable to plain·
tiffs they could not recover as a matter of law. Welchman
v Wood, 9 U.2d 25, 337 P.2d 410 (1959).
Summary judgment as a remedy should be granted with
great cautfon. Watkins v. Simonds, 11 U.2d 46, 354 P.2d 852
(1960).
Summary judgment should only be granted if there
are no material issues of fact to be determined by a trial.
Plaintiffs contend that the following issues of fact remain to be determined by the trial court :
1.

Whether or not the conveyance of the subject pro·

perty by Mary Helen Parsons and Montella McKellar Dick
to Frank and Nellie McKeUar was made by mistake.
2.

Whether or not Frank and Nellie McKellar were

bona fide purchasers for value.

I
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3. Whether or not Frank and Nellie Mc Kellar had actual knowledge that Mary Parsons McKeUar and Montella
McKellar Dick held the subject property as trustees.
4. Whether or not plaintiffs had knowledge of the
transfer and whether or not they are subject to the statute
of limitations.
5. Whether or not plaintiffs had a duty to make a
reasonable search or diligent inquiry to determine of the
~ubject property had been conveyed.
Because of these material issues of fact to be determined by the trial court, plaintiffs respeotfully request 'thlat

the case be remanded to the trial court for a trial.
Respectfully submitted,
CARVEL R. SHAFFER
of and 'for
BURTON, BLONQUIST,
CAHOON, MATHESON &
SHAFFER
640 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Appellants

